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REBUTTAL: AN ALTERNATE VIEWPOINT ON
THE RELATIONSHIP OF UNANIMOUS
VERDICTS AND REASONABLE DOUBT
ARTHUR JAY SILVERSTEIN*
In a recent article in this Review, I Professor Anthony A. Morano
argued that the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Johnson v. Louisiana2 that jury unanimity was not mandated had
destroyed what United States v. Perezs had established: namely, "the
integrity and reality, not only of unanimous jury verdicts, but also of
the reasonable doubt rule."4 Professor Morano's contention was that
the combination of a reasonable doubt standard and a unanimous
jury requirement protects the defendant's rights and effectuates
society's interest in retrying a defendant who cannot be unanimously
acquitted.5
This rebuttal of Mr. Morano's article will focus on two particular
issues which he raised and will suggest alternate conclusions to be
drawn from case law and logic. Part I is a discussion of United States
v. Perez; it offers a more limited view of the rule of law established by
that case. Rather than analyze the present state of the law concerning
split verdicts and hung juries as defined in such cases as Johnson v.
Louisiana and Apodaca v. Oregons Part II concentrates on the
inadequacy of retrial after hung juries as a mechanism to balance the
interests of parties to a criminal trial.
I. THE RATIONALE OF United States v. Perez
Professor Morano explained in his article that until 1866 British
jurors were coerced into unanimity by being forbidden their
discharge and deprived of food and necessities until a verdict was
reached.7 Mr. Morano continued that American courts were faced
with a dilemma when a jury was unable to agree on the unanimous
verdict required. Some courts favored the British rule forbidding
*Member of the Bars of New Jersey and District of Columbia.
1. Morano, Historical Development of the Interrelationship of Unanimous
Verdicts and Reasonable Doubt, 10 VAL U.L. REV. 223 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Morano].
2. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
3. 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194 (1824).
4. Morano, supra note 1, at 224.
5. Id. at 229-30.
6. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
7. Morano, supra note 1, at 224.
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discharge of a jury before a verdict, and thus more extreme necessity
was needed to justify putting the defendant to a second trial. Other
courts held a hung jury might be discharged if the trial court decided
further deliberation would not result in agreement, and thus a retrial
would be held for the defendant. This latter approach was adopted
by the Supreme Court in 1824 in United States v. Perez.
It is Mr. Morano's contention that "[t]he rationale of this
prevailing [Perez] position was to assure the integrity of unanimous
jury verdicts by relieving jurors of the coercive British rules."'
However, an analysis of Perez fails to indicate that that decision was
at all concerned with the degree of integrity inherent in unanimous
jury verdicts rendered free of coercion. Mr. Morano correctly notes
that the "clearest statement of this rationale appears in People v.
Olcott,"9 an 1801 New York case. But there is no evidence to support
the existence of any influence of the O/cott rationale on the United
States Supreme Court 23 years later when it rendered its decision in
Perez. Olcott was not discussed or cited in the latter case, which never
indicated a concern for the integrity of unanimous jury verdicts.
Perez held in substance that the failure of a jury to agree on a
verdict is grounds for the discharge of that jury, but it constitutes no
legal bar to a future trial. The Perez Court indicated:
[I]n all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of
justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving
any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest
necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would
otherwise be defeated. 10
The terse Perez decision never specifically mentioned the fifth
amendment or double jeopardy. However, in United States v.
Haskell," decided one year before Perez, Mr. Justice Washington,
riding circuit, analyzed the fifth amendment and perhaps provided
an insight into the thinking of the Supreme Court at that time
regarding double jeopardy and hung juries.
The Haskell case involved a hung jury caused by the alleged
insanity of one of the jurors. Among other grounds the defendant
cited the fifth amendment as a bar to retrial. Justice Washington
wrote:
8. Id. at 226.
9. Id at 226 n.19.
10. 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 194 (1824).
11. 26 F. Cas. 207 (No. 15, 321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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[W]e are clearly of the opinion, that the jeopardy spoken of
in this article [fifth amendment] can be interpreted to
mean nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of the
prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon. This
was the meaning affixed to the expression by the common
law, notwithstanding some loose expressions to be found in
some elementary treatises, or in the opinions of some
judges.... [T]hat article does not apply to a jeopardy short
of conviction. 12
It should be noted that neither Perez nor Haskell discussed the
policy arguments of forcing a jury to agree. Rather, these cases were
concerned with the meaning of the term "jeopardy" in the fifth
amendment and the intended scope of the amendment, and they
emphasized the trial court's responsibility to exercise carefully its
discretionary power to grant retrials.
The only legal issue considered by the Perez Court was when
jeopardy attached for the purposes of barring another trial by virtue
of the fifth amendment. In the United States, several state courts
(whose views are acknowledged in Perez and Haskell) had formulated
a rule to the effect that jeopardy attaches at the moment the jury is
sworn and empanelled. Under such a formulation, the defendant
could not be tried again for the same offense without violating the
double jeopardy clauses of state constitutions. 13 Perez was the
medium through which the Supreme Court would resolve the
issue of whether a hung jury had the effect of barring a subsequent
prosecution. That this was the only purpose and impact of Perez has
been mentioned in other writings. In a more recent case, 14 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter cited Perez and stated:
Mr. Justice Story had himself taken a non-literal view of
the constitutional provision in United States v. Perez ..
where, writing for the Court, he found that discharge of a
jury that had failed to agree was no bar to a second trial.' 5
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Story himself also cited the Haskell and
Perez decisions as merely standing for the proposition that certain
retrials are not barred by double jeopardy because jeopardy had not
yet attached.'6
12. Id. at 212.
13. F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 395 (12th ed. 1932).
14. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
15. Id. at 198, 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
1787 n.3 (3d ed. 1858).
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Thus, there is no evidence to support Professor Morano's conten-
tion that the Perez decision was intended to produce uncoerced,
unanimous jury verdicts. Rather, Perez was concerned with the time
of the attachment of jeopardy during a criminal trial in light of the
defendant's fifth amendment protections.
II. A BALANCING OF INTERESTS - THE HUNG JURY AS EVIDENCE
OF THE EXISTENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT
Professor Morano's preference for retrial after a hung jury to
achieve a unanimous verdict is reflected in his statement that:
It is difficult to imagine a more perfect reconciliation of the
community's interest in incapacitating criminals and its
desire that the innocent be secure from conviction than
that resulting from an integrated, interdependent unani-
mous verdict-reasonable doubt standard.17
Thus, Professor Morano advocates retrials after hung juries, since he
believes this procedure will bring uncoerced unanimity to the
verdict. He recommends unanimity to insure a verdict which is
beyond a reasonable doubt, because he feels that a verdict rendered
by a substantial majority of jurors increases the probability of both
erroneous acquittals and convictions. 8
Such an approach is by no means the most compelling or
persuasive method of advancing societal interests. As an alternative,
this rebuttal proposes that a hung jury does indeed reflect the
existence of reasonable doubt and that retrials should not be granted
after a hung jury.
An analysis of 161 hung juries by Professors Kalven and Zeisel
has led them to conclude that hung juries are, for the greatest part, a
response to the genuine questions of proof in the case.' 9 In the case of
hung juries, both the majority and minority jurors are exercising the
intelligence needed for a proper deliberative verdict, but they are
deadlocked because the evidence for some of them is insufficient to
negate the presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Consequently, even one hung juror should justify an immediate
acquittal since he reflects the existence of reasonable doubt.
It is true that the Supreme Court impliedly refused this
argument in Johnson v. Louisiana,20 when it rejected the assertion
17. Morano, supra note 1, at 229.
18. Id.
19. See Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury, 48 CHI. BAR REV. 195, 201 (1967).
20. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). See generally Morano, supra note 1.
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that a non-unanimous jury demonstrated the prosecution's failure to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and noted that in federal
court a hung jury results in a retrial, not an acquittal. 21 Mr. Justice
Marshall's dissent in Johnson offered some validity to the argument
for acquittal, however, when it noted that the disagreement among
the jurors in a hung trial is merely a showing that the prosecution
had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.22 Marshall
pointed out that to permit a second trial with new evidence before a
new jury would give the prosecutor a second chance to present a
stronger case for conviction, if he were able to do so; but that ignores
the fact that the doubt of some of the original jurors automatically
creates a constitutional bar to conviction at a subsequent trial.23 It is
suggested that courts in the future should follow Mr. Justice
Marshall's lead and interpret the double jeopardy clause as one which
denies the prosecution a second opportunity to convict after a hung
jury.
Permitting a retrial after a hung jury detracts from the objective
of minimizing the possibility of convicting one who has not com-
mited any crime. If the state is permitted to try the issue before
enough juries, conviction is arguably inevitable.24 The government
with its unlimited resources can make repeated attempts to convict
the accused, thus enhancing the possibility that an innocent man will
be found guilty. Lacking the resources of the state prosecutor,
defense's presentation in retrials would degenerate in comparison.
Successive retrials after hung juries begin to make the proceedings
resemble a trial by attrition.25
Protection against double jeopardy is also designed to put to rest
the fear of future prosecution or repeated prosecutions for harass-
ment purposes. Hung juries and retrials, however, continue to
prolong the agony and doubt. Although the trial ends in a hung jury,
the defendant throughout the trial has been completely exposed to the
risk of conviction. Also, a criminal action creates an inherent stigma
on the defendant which ought to be kept to a minimum. 26 A person
should not be required to suffer more than a single intrusion into his
life by trial for each alleged infraction. Retrials after hung juries
require a presentation of the entire case all over again: accusation,
21. 406 U.S. at 362-63.
22. 406 U.S. at 399, 401-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 402.
24. See Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 812-16 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(concurring opinion).
25. United States v. Castellanos, 349 F. Supp. 720, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd,
478 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1973).
26. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 478 (1971).
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cross examinations, and all the other unpleasantries of a criminal
trial. The prosecution has had its day in court. If a trial on the merits
has resulted in a hung jury, then the verdict should be acquittal.
Apparently, the evidence has simply failed to persuade all the jurors
that the defendant was guilty.
CONCLUSION
Professor Morano concluded his article by stating that if the
Perez Court had held,
that trial courts should instruct hung juries to acquit
because of the prosecution's failure to satisfy its burden of
persuading each member of the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . [then] it would have left the Court open to
criticism for being unresponsive to society's interests in the
administration of criminal justice.27
On the contrary, this rebuttal has demonstrated that the Perez Court
was not concerned with bringing about uncoerced unanimity in jury
verdicts. Furthermore, the empirical study of Kalven and Zeisel2
and the persuasive logic of Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent in Johnson29
indicate that acquittal after a hung jury is the alternative which is
most responsive to society's interests in the realm of criminal justice.
27. Morano, supra note 1, at 230.
28. See note 19 supra.
29. See note 22 supra.
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